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JUDICIAL CODE

CHAPTER 27
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Section
78-27-1.

Tender - Offer in writing sufficient.
78-27-2.
Receipt may be demanded as condition to payment or deposit.
78-27-3.
Objection to tender - Must be
specified or deemed waived.
78-27-4.
Money deposited in court.
78-27-5 to 78-27-11. Repealed.
78-27-12. State, state officers and political
subdivisions not required to
give bond.
78-27-13. Payment of costs by state.
78-27-14. Payment of costs by county.
78-27-15. Salaries of public officers subject to
' garnishment.
78-27-16. Service of process.
78-27-17. Sureties on stay bonds entitled to
subrogation.
78-27-18. Provisions as to depositions made
applicable to nonjudicial proceedings.
78-27-19. "By law"• defined.
78-27-20. Sworn certificate of nonresident doing business here.
78-27-21. Effect of failure to file certificate Service of process upon nonresident.
78-27-22. Jurisdiction over nonresidents
Purpose of provision.
78-27-23. Jurisdiction over nonresidents
Definitions.
78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents
Acts submitting person to jurisdiction.
78-27-25. Jurisdiction over nonresidents
Service of process.
78-27-26. Jurisdiction over nonresidents
Only claims arising from enumerated acts may be asserted.
78-27-27. Jurisdiction over nonresidents
Default judgments.
78-27-28. Jurisdiction over nonresidents
When may be exercised.
78-27-29 to 78-27-31. Superseded.
78-27-32. Release or settlement of personal
injury claim - When voidable.
78-27-33. Statement of injured person When inadmissible as evidence.
78-27-34. Release, settlement, or statement
by injured person - When rescission or disavowal provisions
inapplicable.
78-27-35. Release, settlement, or statement
by injured person - Notice of
rescission or disavowal.

Section
78-27-36.

78-27-37.
78-27-38.
78-27-39.
78-27-40.
78-27-41.
78-27-42.
78-27-43.
78-27-44.
78-27-45.

78-27-46.
78-27-47.

78-27-48.

78-27-49.
78-27-50.
78-27-51.
78-27-52.
78-27-53.

78-27-54.
78-27-55.
78-27-56.
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Right of rescission or disavowal of
release, settlement, or statement by injured person in addition to other provisions.
Definitions.
Comparative negligence.
Separate special verdicts on total
damages and proportion of
fault.
Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault - No contribution.
Joinder of defendants.
Release to one defendant does not
discharge other defendants.
Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, contribution:
Personal injury judgments - Interest authorized.
Financial information privacy Written consent or court order
for disclosure by financial institution - Exception - "Person"
defined.
Financial information privacy Notice to person about whom
information sought.
Financial information privacy Intervention to challenge or
stay order - Burden on governmental entity.
Financial information privacy Reimbursement of financial institution for costs of obtaining
information.
Financial information privacy Admissibility of information restricted.
Financial information privacy Act inapplicable to certain official investigations.
Inherent risks of skiing - Public
policy.
Inherent risks of skiing - Definitions.
Inherent risks of skiing - Bar
against claim or recovery from
operator for injury from risks
inherent in sport.
Inherent risks of skiing - Trail
boards listing inherent risks
and limitations on liability.
Repealed.
Attorney's fees - Award where action or defense in bad faith.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Section
78-27-56.5. Attorney's
fees
Reciprocal
rights to recover attorney's fees.
78-27-57. Attorney's fees awarded to state
funded agency in action against
state or subdivision - Forfeit of
appropriated monies.

78-27-1. Tender -

Section
78-27-58.
78-27-59.

78-27-1

Service of judicial process by persons other than law enforcement officers.
Immunity for transient shelters.

Offer in writing sufficient.

An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written
instrument or specific personal property is, if not accepted, equivalent to the
actual production and tender of the money, instrument or property.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-1.
Cross-References. - Deposit in court of
sum tendered, § 78-27-4.
Offer to allow judgment to be taken for speci-

fled amount, effect, Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 68(b).
Tender of money before suit, Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 68(a).
Uniform Commercial Code, Sales, tender of
payment, § 70A-2-511.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Ability to make tender good.
Extinguishing lien.
Foreclosure.
Tender to attorney.
Ability to make tender good.
Under this section, where a person makes a
tender in writing, he is excused from actually
producing the money at the time of making the
tender, but the statute excuses no other act or
requirement on his part which would be necessary to make a valid tender, independently of
the statute. To have the effect of a valid tender,
the party tendering must have the ability to
produce it, and must act in good faith. Nor does
such a tender deprive the creditor of the allowance of a reasonable time in which to ascertain
the amount due, and to determine whether he
will accept; and if he accepts, and debtor fails
to produce the money, his tender will be of no
avail. Hyams v. Bamberger, 10 Utah 3, 36 P.
202 (1894).

Extinguishing lien.
Valid tender made by pledgor of personal
property at any time before sale will have the
effect of extinguishing pledgee's lien. Hyams v.
Bamberger, 10 Utah 3, 36 P. 202 (1894).
Foreclosure.
In action to foreclose real estate contract, a
valid tender of all existing delinquencies prevents plaintiff from foreclosing on the mortgage and note. Romero v. Schmidt, 15 Utah 2d
300, 392 P.2d 37 (1964).
Tender to attorney.
A tender to an attorney with authority to
collect is the same as though made to creditor
himself. Hirsh v. Ogden Furn. & Carpet Co., 48
Utah 434, 160 P. 283 (1916).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 74 Am. Jur. 2d Tender§ 7.
C.J.S. - 86 C.J.S. Tender § 31.
Key Numbers. - Tender=
11.
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Receipt may be demanded
ment or deposit.

as condition to pay-

Whoever pays money, or delivers an instrument or property, is entitled to a
receipt therefor from the person to whom the payment or delivery is made,
and may demand a proper signature to such receipt as a condition of the
payment or delivery.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -

§ 3.

78-27-3.

C.J.S. - 70 C.J.S. Payment § 45 et seq.
Key Numbers. - Payment e=, 35.

60 Am. Jur. 2d Payment

Objection to tender
deemed waived.

-

Must be specified

or

The person to whom a tender is made must, at the time, specify any objection he may have to the money, instrument or property, or he is deemed to
have waived it; and, if the objection is to the amount of money, the terms of
the instrument or the amount or kind of property, he must specify the
amounts, terms or kind which he requires, or be precluded from objection
afterwards.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Conditions.
Interest.
Tender.
-By check.
-By mail.
Conditions.
A tender, to be good, must be free from any
condition which the tenderer does not have a
right to insist upon. Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah
2d 351, 273 P.2d 974 (1954).
Interest.
If tender is made of full face of account, and
no demand for interest is made, interest, at
least for the purposes of a tender, is waived.
Hirsh v. Ogden Furn. & Carpet Co., 48 Utah
434, 160 P. 283 (1916), explained in Sieverts v.
White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d 974 (1954).
Tender.
-By check.
Where a tender is made by check, the person

to whom it is tendered must specify his objections or he will be deemed to have waived all
objections, except such as he insists upon when
tender is made. Hirsh v. Ogden Furn. & Carpet
Co., 48 Utah 434, 160 P. 283 (1916), explained
in Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d
974 (1954). See also, Ulibarri v. Christenson, 2
Utah 2d 367, 275 P.2d 170 (1954).
A check for the amount due, presented
within time and when no exception is taken to
the form of the tender, is a valid and legal tender of the amount due, but only when there are
adequate funds in the account of the drawer to
pay such check upon presentation in due
course. Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273
P.2d 974 (1954).
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-By mail.
Tender of check by mail is good tender in
absence of special objections. Hirsh v. Ogden

Furn. & Carpet Co., 48 Utah 434, 160 P. 283
(1916), explained in Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah
2d 351, 273 P.2d 974 (1954).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. -74 Am. Jur. 2d Tender§ 10.
C.J.S. - 86 C.J.S. Tender§§ 12, 17, 26, 34,
38, 43.

78-27-4. Money deposited

Key Numbers. -

Tender

15(3).

in court.

If money is deposited in court, it must be paid to the clerk, who must deposit
it with the county treasurer, by him to be held subject to the order of the court.
For the safekeeping of the money so deposited with him the treasurer is liable
on his official bond.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-4.
Cross-References. - Court may order de-

posit upon motion, Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 67.
Defendant's deposit of tendered amount,
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 68(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Substantial compliance.
Defendant corporation and its officers, who
deposited corporate check with clerk and
arranged for check to be honored if presented
in due course substantially complied with
court order made under this section, even

though plaintiff instead of clerk was named as
payee and corporation became insolvent
thereby causing check to be dishonored. Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 386,472
P.2d 941 (1969).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deposits in
Court §§ 9 to 12.
C.J.S. - 26A C.J.S. Deposits in Court §§ 5
to 7.
A.L.R. - Funds deposited in court as subject
of garnishment, 1 A.L.R.3d 936.

78-27-5 to 78-27-11.

Appealability of order directing payment of
money into court, 15 A.L.R.3d 568.
Key Numbers. - Deposits in Court
3, 4,
8.

Repealed.

Repeals. - Sections 78-27-5 to 78-27-11 (L.
1951, ch. 28, §§ 1 to 7; C. 1943, Supp.,
104-27-4.10 to 104-27-4.16), relating to proce-

dure and appeals in escheat matters, were repealed by Laws 1957, ch. 6, § 30. For present
comparable provisions, see § 78-44-1 et seq.

78-27-12. State, state officers and political
not required to give bond.

subdivisions

In any civil action or proceeding wherein the state is a party plaintiff, or
any state officer in his official capacity or on behalf of the state, or any county
or city or other public corporation is a party plaintiff or defendant, no bond,
written undertaking, or security can be required of the state, or any such
officer thereof, or of any county or city or other public corporation; but on
complying with the other provisions of this code, the state, or any state officer
411
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acting in his official capacity, or any county or city or other public corporation,
has the same rights, remedies and benefits as if the bond, undertaking or
security were given and approved as required by law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-5.
Cross-References.
- Stay of judgment

without appeal bond, Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 62(e).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
State agency.
In condemnation proceedings, the state road
commission (now transportation commission)
is entitled to an order of occupancy without
furnishing a bond if it has otherwise complied
with the law, because in such case members of
the commission are prosecuting action in their
official capacity as the state road commission

78-27-13.

Payment

of Utah. Barnes v. Wade, 90 Utah 1, 58 P.2d
297 (1936).
Towns.
Town, being a public corporation, is not required to give an undertaking on appeal. In re
Peterson, 87 Utah 144, 48 P.2d 468 (1935).

of costs by state.

When a state is a party and costs are awarded against it, they must be paid
out of the state treasury, and the auditor shall draw his warrant therefor on
the General Fund.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-6.
Cross-References. - Actions against offi-

cers responsible for law enforcement and service of process, bond liable for costs,
§ 78-11-10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability.
Sovereign's liability.
Applicability.
This section does not authorize the taxation
of costs against the state but only provides the
source from which such costs shall be paid
when authorized. Tracy v. Peterson, 1 Utah 2d
213, 265 P.2d 393 (1954).

Sovereign's liability.
In the absence of statute authorizing it, the
sovereign is not liable for costs. United States
v. Stevens, 8 Utah 3, 28 P. 869 (1892).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 81A C.J.S. States § 328.
Key Numbers. - States e=> 215.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 72 Am. Jur. 2d States, Territories, and Dependencies § 127.

78-27-14.

Payment

of costs by county.

When a county is a party and costs are awarded against it, they must be
paid out of the county treasury.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-7.
Cross-References. - Actions against offi-

cers responsible for law enforcement and service of process, bond liable for costs, § 78-1110.
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78-27-15

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Attorney fees in action against county officer.
Municipal corporation.
Attorney fees in action against county officer.
In action against county officer, plaintiff is
not liable for defendant's attorney fees, for it is
duty of county attorney to appear for defendant
in the action. Ryan-Ream Cattle Co. v. Slaughter, 6 Utah 278, 21 P. 997 (1889).

Municipal corporation.
In proceedings brought by municipality for
violation of its ordinances, defendant's costs
cannot, in absence of a statute authorizing it,
be taxed against the municipality. Nephi City
v. Forrest, 41 Utah 433, 126 P. 332 (1912).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations Counties and Other Political
Subdivisions § 846.

78-27-15.

Salaries
ment.

C.J.S. - 20 C.J.S. Counties § 338.
Key Numbers. - Counties
228.

of public officers

subject to garnish-

The state of Utah, any county, city, town, district, board of education or
other subdivision of the state, and any officer, board or institution, having in
its possession or under its control any credits or other personal property of, or
owing any debt to, the defendant in any action, whether as salary or wages, as
a public official or employee, or otherwise, shall be subject to attachment,
garnishment and execution under such rights, remedies and procedure as are
or may be made applicable to attachment, garnishment and execution, respectively, in other cases, except as in the next section [§ 78-27-16] provided.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-8.
Compiler's Notes. - There is. a possible
conflict between this section and § 63-30-22
which provides, in part: "nor shall execution,
attachment or garnishment issue against the
governmental entity."

Cross-References. - Attachment, Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 64C.
Execution, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69.
Garnishment, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
64D.
Governmental Immunity Act, no execution,
attachment or garnishment to issue, § 63-3022.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Garnishment.
Official compensation of public officer is subject to garnishment. Tribune Reporter Printing
Co. v. Homer, 51 Utah 153, 169 P. 170 (1917).

Formerly, a teacher's salary in hands of
board of education could not be garnished.
Chamberlin v. Watters, 10 Utah 298, 37 P. 566
(1894).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 6 Am Jur. 2d Attachment
and Garnishment § 78 et seq.
C.J.S. - 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 43.
A.L.R. - Construction and application of 42
U.S.C. § 659(a) authorizing garnishment a-

gainst United States or District of Columbia
for enforcement of child support and alimony
obligations, 44 A.L.R. Fed. 494.
Key Numbers. - Garnishment
18.
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Service of process.

The process shall be served only upon the auditor of the legal subdivision
garnished, and, in case there is no auditor, then on the clerk of the county,
city, town, district, board of education, or other subdivisions of the state, or
board or institution, and the answer of such auditor or clerk shall be final and
conclusive.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-9.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 6 Am. Jur. 2d Attachment
and Garnishment § 339.
C.J.S. - 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 156.
A.L.R. - Civil liability of one making false

78-27-17.

or fraudulent return of process, 31 A.L.R.3d
1393.
Key Numbers. - Garnishment€-> 95.

Sureties on stay bonds entitled to subrogation.

Whenever any surety on an undertaking on appeal executed to stay proceedings upon a money judgment pays the judgment, either with or without
action, after its affirmance by the appellate court, he is subrogated to the
rights of the judgment creditor, and is entitled to control, enforce and satisfy
such judgment in all respects as if he had recovered the same.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-10.
Cross-References. - Contribution as between joint debtors, Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 69(h).

Judgment on multiple claims, Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 54(b).
Stay upon appeal, Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 62(d).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Surety automatically substituted.
Litigation is not necessary to effect substitution of surety, paying judgment after its affir-

mance, to rights of judgment creditor. Butterfield v. Mountain Ice & Cold Storage Co., 11
Utah 194, 39 P. 824 (1895).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 83 C.J.S. Subrogation § 47.
Key Numbers. - Subrogation €-> 7(9).

Am. Jur. 2d. - 73 Am. Jur. 2d Subrogation

§ 59.

78-27-18.

Provisions as to depositions
nonjudicial proceedings.

made applicable to

The provisions of law relating to the taking of depositions in actions pending before the courts of this state are applicable to commissions, boards and
officers authorized to subpoena witnesses and take testimony, the necessary
substitutions and changes being made.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-11.

Cross-References. - Depositions, Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 26 et seq.
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78-27-20

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions
and Discovery § 6.
C.J.S. - 26A C.J.S. Depositions §§ 2, 15.

Key Numbers. - Pretrial Procedure
61 et seq.

¢"'

12,

78-27-19. "By law" defined.
Wherever in this code the term "by law" is used with reference to any act or
thing done or to be done, such term shall refer to all statutes in effect as well
as the Rules of Civil Procedure or other court rules, and any decision of the
Supreme Court interpreting the same.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-12.

78-27-20.

Sworn certificate of nonresident
• here.

doing business

Every nonresident person other than insurance organizations doing business in this state in one or more places, either in his own name or a common
trade name, and said businesses are conducted under the supervision of a
manager, superintendent, or agent, shall file or cause to be filed annually, on
or before January 15th, with the Division of Corporations and Commercial
Code, a certificate under oath setting forth the name of and address of the
manager, superintendent, or agent upon whom service of process may be had
in any action arising out of the conduct of such business.
History: L. 1951, ch. 20, § 2; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-14; L. 1984, ch. 66, § 205.
Amendment Notes. - The 1984 amendment substituted "Division of Corporations and
Commercial Code" for "secretary of state of the
state of Utah."
Effective Dates. - Section 206 of Laws

1984, ch. 66 provided: "This act shall take effect July 1, 1984."
Cross-References. - Foreign corporations,
registered office and agent, §§ 16-10-109 to
16-10-111.
Foreign fraternals, service of process upor,
commissioner, § 31A-14-203.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Noncompliance.
-Effect.
Purpose of section.
Noncompliance.
-Effect.
Nonresident individual transacting business
in Utah on effective date of predecessor section
had duty to designate agent to be served with
process, and his failure to do so did not operate
to defeat plaintiffs right to claim benefits of
act. Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P.2d
222 (1948).

Purpose of section.
This section was adopted to enable a nonresident doing business in this state to select such
agent upon whom process could be served as
would suit his convenience, and assure him of
notice of any suit which might be brought
against him growing out of any business transacted in this state. Alward v. Green, 122 Utah
35, 245 P.2d 855 (1952).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. -

§§ 75 to 79.

78-27-21.

C.J.S. - 72 C.J.S. Process § 31.
Key Numbers. - Process €=>58.

62 Am. Jur. 2d Process

Effect of failure to file certificate process upon nonresident.

Service of

Whenever any such nonresident doing business as provided in the preceding
section[§ 78-27-20] shall fail to file such certificate, or such manager, superintendent or agent designated in such certificate cannot be found within the
state of Utah, service of process upon such nonresident in any action arising
out of the conduct of his business may be had by serving any person employed
by or acting as agent for such nonresident.
History: L. 1951, ch. 20, § 3; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-27-15.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 36 Am. Jur. 2d Foreign Corporations § 538.
C.J.S. - 20 C.J.S. Corporations§ 1943; 72
C.J.S. Process § 31.

78-27-22.

Jurisdiction
provision.

Key Numbers. - Corporations€=> 668; Process €=>62.

over nonresidents

-

Purpose

of

It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public
interest demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of
redress against nonresident persons, who, through certain significant minimal contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's
protection. This legislative action is deemed necessary because of technological progress which has substantially increased the flow of commerce between
the several states resulting in increased interaction between persons of this
state and persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to citizens of this
state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 1.
Meaning of "this act". - The term "this
act," referred to in the second paragraph,
means Laws 1969, Chapter 246, which appears
as §§ 78-27-22 to 78-27-28.
Cross-References. - Foreign corporations,
registered office and agent, §§ 16-10-109 to
16-10-111.

Foreign fraternals, service of process upon
commissioner, § 31A-14-203.
Nonresident motorists, long-arm provision,
§ 41-12a-403.
Service of process, Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 4.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Implementation.
Nonresident plaintiffs.
Special appearance.

Implementation.
The courts have the responsibility to protect
Utah citizens from suits in other states unless
they have engaged in some conduct or activity
there beyond mere presence, and to afford the
citizens of other states the same protection in
the courts of Utah. Union Ski Co. v. Union
Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976).
Nonresident plaintiffs.
Language of this section indicating purpose
of legislature in enacting long-arm statute was
to protect citizens of the state does not render
remedy afforded by long-arm statute unavailable to nonresident plaintiffs since § 78-27-24
neither expressly nor by implication precludes

nonresidents who have a permit to do business
in Utah from obtaining jurisdiction by longarm service. Hughes Tool Co. v. Meier, 486
F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1973).

Special appearance.
Where defendant, an out-of-state corporation
not licensed to do business in Utah, appeared
and moved to discharge writ of attachment on
ground that it was improperly issued, the appearance was not general since there was no
request for any affirmative relief, and the court
did not obtain personal jurisdiction over the
movant by virtue of it. Ted R. Brown & Assocs.
v. Carnes Corp., 547 P.2d 206 (Utah 1976).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - In Personam Jurisdiction Expanded: Utah's Long Arm Statute,
1970 Utah L. Rev. 222.
Brigham Young Law Review. - Minimum Contacts in Single Contract Cases:

78-27-23.

Jurisdiction

Burger King Has Its Way, 1986 B.Y.U.
505.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 20 Am. Jur. 2d
§ 146.
C.J.S. - 21 C.J.S. Courts § 74 et
Key Numbers. - Courts 'P 10 et

over nonresidents

-

L. Rev.
Courts
seq.
seq.

Definitions.

As used in this act:
(1) The words "any person" mean any individual, firm, company, association, or corporation.
(2) The words "transaction of business within this state" mean activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state
which affect persons or businesses within the state of Utah.
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 2.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-22.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Nonresident plaintiff.
Foreign corporation lawfully authorized to
do business in the state of Utah is a business
within the state of Utah and entitled to the

protection of§§ 78-27-22 to 78-27-28. Hughes
Tool Co. v. Meier, 486 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.
1973).
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Jurisdiction over nonresidents
ting person to jurisdiction.

-

Acts submit-

Any person, notwithstanding§
16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the following
enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising
from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by
breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this
state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within
this state at the time of contracting;
((D with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child
support, having resided, in the marital relationship, within this state
notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state; or the commission
in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendent had
no control; or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives
rise to a paternity suit under Chapter 45a, Title 78, to determine paternity for the purpose of establishing responsibility for child support.
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 3; 1983, ch.
160, § 1; 1987, ch. 35, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1983 amendment added Subsection (7).

The 1987 amendment

(6).

rewrote Subsection

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Causing of any injury.
-Telephone conversation.
Claim arising from.
Contracting to supply.
Nonresident plaintiffs.
Pleading and proof.
Transaction of any business.
-Minimal contacts.
-Single sales transaction.
--Transaction
by agent.
Cited.

Causing of any injury.
Court properly found jurisdiction over nonresident defendants under Subsection (3)
where tortious injury involved had foreseeable
impact in Utah, notwithstanding plaintiff athletic team was owned by Colorado corporation
and critical events apparently occurred in California. Mountain States Sports, Inc. v.

Sharman, 353 F. Supp. 613 (D. Utah 1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 548 F.2d 905 (10th Cir.
1977).

-Telephone
conversation.
The language of Subsection (3) is broad
enough to create jurisdiction as to individual
defendants based solely upon alleged defamatory telephone conversations initiated by the
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defendants outside the state, but causing injury in this state; and such a statutory application does not violate due process. Berrett v.
Life Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 946 (D. Utah 1985).

Claim arising from.
If action is brought pursuant to long-arm
statute because defendant foreign corporation
is not doing substantial business in the forum
state, plaintiff must show that his claim arises
out of some contact defendant has with the
forum state, some action undertaken by defendant by which it can be shown that defendant
has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state. Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d
1307 (Utah 1980).
Where foreign corporation's purposeful activities within Utah consisted of its sale of
equipment ultimately destined for installation
in Utah and its entry into the state for purpose
of overseeing installation of that equipment,
these contacts were not sufficient to establish
specific jurisdiction for purpose of litigating alleged contract for commissions. Roskelley &
Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1980).
Contracting to supply.
The court's extension of jurisdiction over a
foreign citizen was a reasonable and valid exercise of jurisdictional power in an action arising directly out of and substantially connected
to a modified contract which was negotiated,
drafted, and signed by the defendant when he
was in Utah. Synergetics ex rel. Lancer Indus.,
Inc. v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106
(Utah 1985).
Utah court's exercise of jurisdiction over a
nonresident manufacturer did not violate due
process and was a valid exercise of jurisdictional power where although such manufacturer was a corporation located in New York,
had no offices in Utah, owned no property in
Utah, employed no representatives in Utah,
did not solicit business or advertise or circulate
sales materials in Utah, such manufacturer
did employ representatives in other states and
supplied goods to buyers outside New York,
contracted to supply goods in the state of Utah
to a Utah corporation, the cause of action arose
out of the manufacture of the goods supplied in
Utah, and under the facts of the case the importance of the state's interest in assuming jurisdiction outbalanced the minor inconvenience to the nonresident manufacturer if required to defend the action in Utah. Mallory
Eng'g, Inc. v. Ted R. Brown & Assocs., 618 P.2d
1004 (Utah), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1029, 101 S. Ct. 602, 66 L. Ed. 492
(1980).
Nonresident plaintiffs.
Use of this section to obtain in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents is not restricted to

78-27-24

citizens of Utah; foreign corporation with a
valid permit to do business in Utah can obtain
jurisdiction over nonresidents by service under
this section, notwithstanding
language of
§ 78-27-22 which indicates purpose of legislature in enacting long-arm statute was to protect citizens of the state. Hughes Tool Co. v.
Meier, 486 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1973).

Pleading and proof.
When jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff
cannot solely rely on allegations of jurisdiction
in its complaint in the face of an affidavit by
defendant which specifically contradicts those
general allegations. Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco,
Inc., 610 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1980).
Transaction of any business.
Any difference between the "doing business"
and "minimal contacts" tests is probably more
in semantics than substance and in practical
application they are essentially the same; the
question is whether the corporation is doing
business within the state in a real and substantial sense. Hill v. Zale Corp., 25 Utah 2d
357, 482 P.2d 332 (1971); distinguished in Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362
F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973).
The "doing business" concept differs from the
"minimal contacts" concept in that under the
former once it is shown that defendant has conducted substantial and continuous business activity within the forum state, defendant is subject to litigation related or unrelated to that
business, whereas under the "minimal contacts" concept, plaintiffs claim must arise out
of some contact defendant has with the forum
state. Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d
1307 (Utah 1980); Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978).
Manufacturer's various business activities
including contracting to supply goods and pro'.
viding services incident to installation of its
product in Utah, constituted the transaction of
business and contracting to supply goods
within the state so as to render manufacturer
amenable for any actions arising from those
activities; contract authorizing salesman to receive orders for and enter into contracts to supply manufactured goods was an element of the
business conducted by the manufacturer so
that Utah court had jurisdiction under longarm statute. Brown v. Carnes Corp., 611 P.2d
378 (Utah 1980).
Appointment of a Utah administrator for estate of nonresident decedent did not constitute
activity within this state which would bring
decedent or his estate within jurisdiction of
Utah courts with respect to tort committed in
foreign state. Hanks v. Administrator of Estate
of Jensen, 531 P.2d 363 (Utah 1974).
Any activity which would bring a nonresident tort-feasor within Utah long-arm statute
would have to be something done by the party
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himself or his agent, and the fact that a nonresident defendant is insured by an insurance
company which does business in this state does
not bring such defendant within jurisdiction of
Utah laws. Hanks v. Administrator of Estate of
Jensen, 531 P.2d 363 (Utah 1974).
Nevada truck rental agency whose only activity in Utah was that its trucks were sometimes driven over Utah highways, although
subject to jurisdiction under the nonresident
motorist statute, was not transacting business
within this statute. Mack Fin. Corp. v. Nevada
Motor Rentals, Inc., 529 P.2d 429 (Utah 1974).
Conduct of Nevada Indian Tribal Housing
Authority constituted the "transaction of business" in Utah where, in the course of hiring a
construction company to construct housing on
tribal land in Nevada, the authority had supplied information on the project to a trade journal located in Utah which serviced Utah contractors, supplied the plaintiff Utah contractor
with bid information, sent the plaintiff a Housing and Urban Development Department-approved contract for the plaintiffs signature,
sent the plaintiff a copy of the executed contract, and communicated with the plaintiffs by
telephone and mail prior to and after the
award of the contract. Brown v. Washoe Hous.
Auth., 625 F. Supp. 595 (D. Utah 1985).
Where a Colorado resident telephoned a corporation in Utah and personally contracted for
the corporation to supply drilling mud to a Nevada site, this transaction alone met the Utah
long-arm statute in that it affected persons and
businesses within the state. Nova Mud Corp. v.
Fletcher, 648 F. Supp. 1123 (D. Utah 1986).

-Minimal contacts.
A California corporation who sold drilling
equipment to a Utah corporation for use in
New Mexico and Utah had sufficient minimum
contacts to satisfy due process requirements to
submit itself to Utah jurisdiction when the
equipment failed to perform properly causing
damages since it purposefully contracted with
the Utah corporation and purposefully undertook to supply goods knowing those goods
would be used in Utah. Burt Drilling, Inc. v.
Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980).
Where foreign shipping company contracted
with Utah travel agency to display company's
literature and book shippings for company in
return for commission, and where company's
authoritative agent called on agency in Utah
for business and social reasons and communicated with agency frequently by telephone or
telegraph from outside the state, shipping company was sufficiently engaged in business
within Utah to subject it to jurisdiction of Utah
district court. Foreign Study League v. Holland-America Line, 27 Utah 2d 442, 497 P.2d
244, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060, 93 S. Ct. 557,
34 L. Ed. 512 (1972), distinguished in Engi-

neered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362
F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973).
State court could not obtain jurisdiction of
California automobile dealer under "long-arm"
statute where plaintiff was a California resident when she purchased the car before her
move to Utah, and California dealer never
went into Utah to take advantage of its business climate or the protection of its laws; California dealer lacked the' minimum contacts
with Utah necessary for jurisdiction under the
"long-arm" statute; arguments based on situs
of injury and convenience of forum were not
persuasive; jurisdiction could not be predicated
solely on the ground that an article sold elsewhere by a dealer could be brought into the
state and cause harm. Pellegrini v. Sachs &
Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974) ..
Citizen ofldaho procuring insurance from an
agent in Idaho, who had no business transactions in Utah, did not have the minimal contacts sufficient to establish a business presence
in Utah; the service of summons on him in
Idaho was quashed. Transwestern Gen. Agency
v. Morgan, 526 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1974).
Where plaintiff brought suit for breach of a
contract entered into in California, though
some minor negotiations took place in Utah,
defendant corporation, which did no other business in Utah, did not have the "minimal contacts" necessary to permit the state to acquire
personal jurisdiction over it. Union Ski Co. v.
Union Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah
1976).
Where foreign corporation supplied its franchisees with some instructional and advertising materials, annually or biannually audited
their books to determine the franchise fee, and
allowed them to use the corporate name followed by the legend "(name), franchisee," but
did no other business within the state, its activities were not sufficient to give Utah courts personal jurisdiction over a fraud action
against the corporation. White v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 549 P.2d 439 (Utah), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 986, 97 S. Ct. 506, 50 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976).
Where defendant, a foreign corporation, had
entered into a lease agreement over the telephone and paid the rental fee by mail, and
where its only other contact with Utah was
that its president had once been there to discuss business with plaintiff, there was insufficient contact to give Utah courts jurisdiction
over the corporation in a suit arising out of the
lease agreement. Cate Rental Co. v. Whalen &
Co., 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 1976).
An airline passenger who allegedly had his
luggage lost could not assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign airline which had no personnel, funds, equipment, or operations in
Utah. Mabud v. Pakistan Int'! Airlines, 717
P.2d 1350 (Utah 1986).
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-Single sales transaction.
Purchase of a ring in Utah by a nonresident
visitor who had no other connections with
Utah was insufficient to subject nonresident to
jurisdiction of Utah court in an action brought
by Utah corporation for rescission of the purchase or for the balance of the price of the ring.
Dahnken, Inc. v. Marshinsky, 580 P.2d 596
(Utah 1978).
--Transaction
by agent.
Nonresident defendants were subject to jurisdiction of Utah court in action brought by
Utah corporation to recover balances due on
promissory notes executed to obtain loans for
defendant's business by defendant's Utah
agent whose business office was located in
Utah. Producers Livestock Loan Co. v. Miller,
580 P.2d 603 (Utah 1978).
Where defendant, a Nevada resident and

major stockholder in a Nevada corporation, licensed to do business in Utah, which owned
the assets of a cookie manufacturer, in exchange for extension of credit to the Nevada
corporation executed two guaranties in his personal capacity, both running to plaintiff, a
Utah corporation which supplied the cookie
company's packaging; and during the year following the execution of the guaranties visited
Utah approximately four times and telephoned
his personal agent in the state on a weekly
basis; in action upon the guaranties, defendant
was amenable to service of process in Utah because he had significant and continuing contacts with the state giving him a substantial
business presence there through his personal
agent. Packaging Corp. of Am. v. Morris, 561
P.2d 680 (Utah 1977).
Cited in Kocha v. Gibson Prods. Co., 535
P.2d 680 (Utah 1975).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 235.
Brigham Young Law Review. - Overturning Bellas Hess: Due Process Considerations, 1985, 1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 265.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts
§ 146.
C.J.S. - 21 C.J.S. Courts § 74 et seq.
A.L.R. - In personam jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturer or seller under "longarm" statutes, 19 A.L.R.3d 13.
Applicability, in actions not based on products liability, of state statutes or rules of court
predicating in personam jurisdiction over for-

78-27-25.

Jurisdiction
cess.

eign manufacturers or distributors upon use of
their goods within state, 20 A.L.R.3d 957.
Construction and application of state statutes or rules of court predicating in personam
jurisdiction over nonresidents or foreign corporations on making or performing a contract
within the state, 23 A.L.R.3d 551.
Constructioh and application, as to isolated
acts or transactions, of state statutes or rules of
court predicating in personamjurisdiction over
nonresidents or foreign corporations upon doing business within state, 27 A.L.R.3d 397.
Key Numbers. - Courts
10 et seq.

over nonresidents

=

- Service of pro-

Service of process on any party outside the state may be made pursuant to
the applicable provisions of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service of summons and of a copy of the complaint, if any, may also be made
upon any person located without this state by any individual over 21 years of
age, not a party to the action, with the same force and effect as though the
summons had been personally served within this state. No order of court is
required. An affidavit of the server shall be filed with the court stating the
time, manner and place of service. The court may consider the affidavit, or
any other competent proofs, in determining whether proper service has been
made.
Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to limit or affect the right
to serve process in any other manner provided by law.
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 4.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-22.

421

78-27-26

JUDICIAL CODE
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Default judgment.
Defective summons.
Service upon secretary of state.
Default judgment.
District court did not have jurisdiction to enter a valid default judgment in an action in
personam where the only service of process or
notice of the action was by publication and by
mailing to the last known address of a defendant whose present address was unknown and
who had not been found after diligent inquiry
within the state. Graham v. Sawaya, 632 P.2d
851 (Utah 1981).
Defective summons.
Trial court had no jurisdiction to enter judgment against California resident where service
of summons had been falsified and time al-

lowed for answer was twenty days instead of
thirty days. Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897
(Utah 1975).
Service upon secretary of state.
Notwithstanding that Nevada corporation
which had purchased Utah motel had principal
place of business in California, service was
properly effectuated when process was served
upon Utah secretary of state as agent for the
foreign corporation because the corporation
had appointed no in-state agent to receive process. Rudd v. Crown International, 26 Utah 2d
263, 488 P.2d 298 (1971).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -

§ 48.

78-27-26.

62 Am. Jur. 2d Process

C.J.S. - 72 C.J.S. Process §§ 27, 32.
Key Numbers. - Process <11=>56, 62.

Jurisdiction over nonresidents - Only claims
arising from enumerated acts may be asserted.

Only claims arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted against a
defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this act.
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 5.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-22.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -

§ 146.

78-27-27.

20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts

Jurisdiction
ments.

C.J.S. - 21 C.J.S. Courts § 74 et seq.
Key Numbers. - Courts <11=>10 et seq.

over nonresidents

-

Default judg-

No default shall be entered until the expiration of at least thirty days after
service. A default judgment rendered on service may be set aside only on a
showing which would be timely and sufficient to set aside a default judgment
rendered on personal service within this state.
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 6.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d 1272.
In personarn jurisdiction of nonresident
banking institutions, 9 A.L.R.4th 661.
Key Numbers. - Judgment ea> 119, 120.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 47 Arn. Jur. 2d Judgments

§ 1162.

C.J.S. - 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 188.
A.L.R. - Appealability of order setting

78-27-28.

Jurisdiction
exercised.

over nonresidents

- When may be

Subject to the applicable statute of limitations, jurisdiction established under this act shall be exercised regardless of when the claim arose.
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 7.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-22.

Cross-References.

§ 78-12-1 et seq.

- Limitation of actions,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 20 Arn. Jur. 2d Courts§ 142
et seq.
C.J.S. - 21 C.J.S. Courts § 74 et seq.

78-27-29 to 78-27-31.

Superseded.

Compiler's Notes. - Sections 78-27-29 to
78-27-31 (L. 1973, ch. 48, §§ 1 to 3), providing
that voluntary payments or settlements not be
admissible as evidence, were superseded by

78-27-32.

Rules of Evidence, Rule 409, approved by the
Utah Supreme Court on April 13, 1983, effective September 1, 1983.

Release or settlement of personal injury claim When voidable.

(1) Any release of liability or settlement agreement entered into within a
period of fifteen days from the date of an occurrence causing physical injury to
any person, or entered into prior to the initial discharge of this person from
any hospital or sanitarium in which the injured person is confined as a result
of the injuries sustained in the occurrence, is voidable by the injured person,
as provided in this act.
(2) Notice of cancellation of the release or settlement agreement, together
with any payment or other consideration received in connection with this
release or agreement shall be mailed or delivered to the party to whom the
release or settlement agreement was given, by the later of the following dates:
(a) within fifteen days from the date of the occurrence causing the
injuries which are subject of the settlement agreement or liability release;
or
Cb) within fifteen days after the date of the injured person's discharge
from the hospital or sanitarium in which this person has been confined
continuously since the date of the occurrence causing the injury.
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History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 1.
Meaning of "this act". - The term "this
act", referred to at the end of Subsection (1),
means Laws 1973, Chapter 208, which appears
as §§ 78-27-32 to 78-27-36.

Cross-References. - Compromise of, or offer to compromise, claim inadmissible as proof
of liability, Evidence Rule 408.
Offer of judgment, Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 68.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 66 Am. Jur. 2d § 14 et seq.
C.J.S. - 76 C.J.S. § 38 et seq.
Key Numbers. - Release e=> 25 et seq.

78-27-33.

Statement of injured person - When inadmissible as evidence.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, any statement, either written
or oral, obtained from an injured person within fifteen days of an occurrence
or while this person is confined in a hospital or sanitarium as a result of
injuries sustained in the occurrence, and which statement is obtained by a
person whose interest is adverse or may become adverse to the injured person,
except a law enforcement officer, shall not be admissible as evidence in any
civil proceeding brought by or against the injured person for damages sustained as a result of the occurrence, unless:
(a) a written verbatim copy of the statement has been left with the
injured party at the time the statement was taken; and
(b) the statement has not been disavowed in writing within fifteen days
of the date of the statement or within fifteen days after the date of the
injured person's initial discharge from the hospital or sanitarium m
which the person has been confined, whichever date is later.
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 2.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-32.

Compiler's Notes. - Section 2 of Laws
1973, ch. 208 contained no Subsection (2).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. -

78-27-34.

Release

e=>

25 et seq.

Release, settlement, or statement by injured person - When rescission or disavowal provisions
inapplicable.

(1) This act shall not apply in the following circumstance:
If at least five days prior to signing the settlement agreement, liability
release, or statement, the injured person has signed a statement in writing indicating his willingness that the settlement agreement, liability
release, or statement be given or signed.
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 3.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-32.

Compiler's Notes. - Section 3 of Laws
1973, ch. 208 contained no Subsection (2).
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Key Numbers. -

Release

e=>

25 et seq.

78-27-35. Release, settlement, or statement by injured person - Notice of rescission or disavowal.
Notice of cancellation or notice disavowing a statement, if given by mail, is
given when it is deposited in a mailbox, properly addressed with postage
prepaid. Notice of cancellation given by the injured person need not take a
particular form and is sufficient if it indicates by any form of written expression the intention of the injured person not to be bound by the settlement
agreement, liability release, or disavowed statement.
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 4.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 66 Am. Jur. 2d § 14 et seq.
C.J.S. - 76 C.J.S. § 38 et seq.

78-27-36.

Right of rescission or disavowal of release, settlement, or statement by injured person in addition to other provisions.

The rights provided by this act are intended to be in addition to, and not in
lieu of, any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise
existing in the law.
History: L. 1973, ch. 208, § 5.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-36.

78-27-37.

Definitions.

As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability,
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and
misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is
authorized to act as legal representative.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-37, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986,
ch. 1989, § 1 repeals former§ 78-27-37, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 1, relating to
diminishment of damages and assumption of
risk, and reenacts the above section.
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Comparative

negligence.

The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that
person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
that defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 2.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 2 repeals former § 78-27-38, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 2, relating to
special verdicts, and reenacts the above section.

Cross-References. - Product Liability Act,
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration
or modification of product after sale is substantial contributing cause of injury, § 78-15-5.
Skiers not to make claim against or recover
from ski area operator for injury resulting from
any inherent risk of skiing, § 78-27-53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assumption of risk.
Bailment.
Causation.
Jury instructions.
Last clear chance.
Unit method of determining negligence.
Cited.

Assumption of risk.
"Assumption of risk," i.e., risk of a known
danger voluntarily assumed, may amount to a
lack of due care constituting negligence; where
such is the case and the party assuming the
risk is the plaintiff in an action governed by
comparative negligence statute, he is chargeable with contributory negligence and is liable
•to have his recovery reduced or denied in accordance with its provisions. Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah
1977).
Assumption of risk language is not appropriate to describe the various concepts previously
dealt with under that terminology but is to be
treated, in its secondary sense, as contributory
negligence; when the issue is raised attention
should be focused on whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of due care would
have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge
of it, and if so, whether he would have conducted himself in the manner in which the person seeking to recover acted in light of all the
surrounding circumstances, including the appreciated risk; then, if the unreasonableness of
the person seeking to recover is viewed to be
less than that of the person from whom recovery is sought, any damages allowed should be
diminished in prop·ortion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.

Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Eng'g,
Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980).
As used in § 78-27-37, "assumption of risk"
is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a
known danger. Moore v. Burton Lumber &
Hdwe. Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981).

Bailment.
The comparative negligence statutes do not
change the rule that the negligence of a bailee
in handling the bailed property is not imputed
to the bailor. Otto v. Leany, 635 P.2d 410
(Utah 1981).
Causation.
Trial court committed prejudicial error in
submitting to jury question of plaintiffs comparative negligence where his act of alleged
negligence did not in any way contribute to his
injury, although it may have increased severity of damages; comparative negligence becomes a defense for defendant where plaintiffs
negligent conduct was a contributing factor in
causing injury. Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692
P.2d 728 (Utah 1984).
Jury instructions.
If requested, a trial court must inform the
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the
effect of such an instruction will not be to con-
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fuse or mislead the jury. Dixon v. Stewart, 658
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).
Last clear chance.
With the adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act, the doctrine oflast clear chance as a
distinct tort doctrine was extinguished along
with contributory negligence; however, argument to the jury as to whether a party may or
may not have had the last clear chance to avoid
injury is not precluded, and as bearing on
which party was guilty of the greater negligence, last clear chance becomes just one of
many factors to be weighed in the comparison.
Dixon v~ Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).

78-27-39

Unit method of determining negligence.
In a medical malpractice case, the "Wisconsin" method of determining comparative negligence, whereby each defendant's negligence is
compared against the plaintiffs, was rejected
in favor of the "unit" method whereby the negligence of all the defendants is taken together
in making the comparison. Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903
(Utah 1984).
Cited in Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530
(Utah 1979).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Note, A Primer on
Damages Under the Utah Wrongful Death and
Survival Statutes, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 519.
Comment, McGinn v. Utah Power & Light
Co. - Jury Blindfolding in Comparative Negligence Cases, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 569.
Some Thoughts on the Use of Comparisons
in Products Liability Cases, 1981 Utah L. Rev.
3.
A New Perspective - Has Utah Entered the
Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 Utah L.
Rev. 495, 496.
Mulherin v. Ingersoll: Utah Adopts Comparative Principles in Strict Products Liability
Cases, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 461.
Brigham Young Law Review. - The
Merger of Comparative Fault Principles with
Strict Liability in Utah: Mulherin v. IngersollRand Co., 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 964, 966.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 57 Am. Jur. 2d § 426 et seq.
C.J.S. - 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 169 et
seq ..

78-27-39.

A.L.R. Comparative negligence rule
where misconduct of three or more persons is
involved, 8 A.L.R.3d 722.
Retrospective application of state statute
substituting rule of comparative negligence for
that of contributory negligence, 37 A.L.R.3d
1438.
Indemnity or contribution between joint tortfeasors on basis of relative fault, 53 A.L.R.3d
184.
Modern development of comparative negligence doctrine having applicability to negligence actions generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 339.
Application of comparative negligence doctrine, generally, 86 A.L.R.3d 1206.
Comparative negligence doctrine applied to
actions based on strict liability in tort, 9
A.L.R.4th 633.
Effect of adoption of comparative negligence
rules on assumption of risk and contributory
negligence, 16 A.L.R.4th 700.
Key Numbers. - Negligence""" 97 et seq.

Separate special verdicts on total damages and
proportion of fault.

The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury,
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each
person seeking recovery and to each defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-39, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 3 repeals former § 78-27-39, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 3, relating to
contribution among joint tortfeasors, and reenacts the above section.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jury instructions.
If requested, a trial court must inform the
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it

78-27-40.

finds in a comparative negligence case, if the
effect of such an instruction will not be to confuse or mislead the jury. Dixon v. Stewart, 658
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).

Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault
- No contribuJion.

Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that
defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-40, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 4.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 4 repeals former § 78-27-40, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 4, relating to

settlement by a joint tortfeasor, and reenacts
the above section.
Cross-References. - Enforcement of contribution and reimbursement, Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 69(h).
Joint obligations, § 15-4-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Indemnity contract.
Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor.
Workmen's compensation.
Indemnity contract.
The former comparative negligence provisions did not invalidate an employer's indemnity contract with a third party whereby employer agreed to indemnify the third party
against claims arising out of injuries to the employer's employees. Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187 (Utah
1983).
Plaintiff's minor child as joint tortfeasor.
Where plaintiff was awarded a judgment in
action against a defendant to recover the property loss sustained as the result of a collision
between automobiles operated by defendant

and the minor unemancipated daughter of the
plaintiff, and where the daughter's negligence
contributed to the property loss sustained by
her father, the minor daughter was a joint tortfeasor and liable to the defendant for contribution. Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864 (Utah
1981).
Workmen's compensation.
Employer cannot be a joint tortfeasor as to
an injury to his employee covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Curtis v. Harmon
Elec., Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976); Phillips
v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. - Utah Allows Contribution Against Cotortfeasor De-

spite Immunity from Direct Suit: Bishop v.
Nielsen, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 429.
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78-27-41.

78-27-43

Joinder of defendants.

A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation,
may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having
determined their respective proportions of fault.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-41, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 5.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 5 repeals former § 78-27-41, as en-

78-27-42.

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § '"5,relating to
rights of contribution and indemnity, and reenacts the above section.

Release to one defendant
other defendants.

does not discharge

A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does
not discparge any other defendant unless the release so provides.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-42, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 6.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 6 repeals former § 78-27-42, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 6, relating to
release of joint tortfeasors and a reduction of
claim, and reenacts the above section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 66 Am. Jur. 2d § 35 et seq.
C.J.S. - 76 C.J.S. § 38 et seq.
A.L.R. - Tortfeasor's general release of cotortfeasor as affecting former's right of contribution against cotortfeasor, 34 A.L.R.3d 1374.
Release of one responsible for injury as affecting liability of physician or surgeon for
negligent treatment of injury, 39 A.L.R.3d 260.
Voluntary payment into court of judgment

78-27-43.

against one joint tortfeasor as release of others,
40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Release of one negligently treating injury as
affecting liability of one originally responsible
for injury, 64 A.L.R.3d 839.
Validity and effect of agreement with one
cotortfeasor setting aside his maximum liability and providing for reduction or extinguishment thereof relative to recovery against nonagreeing cotortfeasor, 65 A.L.R.3d 602.

Effect on immunity,
nity, contribution.

exclusive

remedy, indem-

Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common
law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not limited to, governmental immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title 63, and the exclusive
remedy provisions of Chapter 1, Title 35. Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through
78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution arising
from statute, contract, or agreement.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-43, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 7.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 7 repeals former § 78-27-43, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 7, relating to
release of joint tortfeasors and contribution,
and reenacts the above section.
Severability Clauses. - Laws 1986, ch.

199, § 9 provided: "If any prov1s10n of
§§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43, or the applica-

tion of any provisions of those sections to any
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remaining provisions of those sections shall be
given effect without the invalid provision or
application."
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Personal
rized.

injury judgments

-

Interest

autho-

In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injurres sustained by
any person, resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any other person,
corporation, association or partnership, whether by negligence or willful intent of that other person, corporation, association or partnership, and whether
that injury shall have resulted fatally or otherwise, it shall be lawful for the
plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on the special damages alleged
from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action and
it shall be the duty of the court, in entering judgment for plaintiff in that
action, to add to the amount of damages assessed by the verdict of the jury, or
found by the court, interest on that amount calculated at 8% per annum from
the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action to the
date of entering the judgment, and to include it in that judgment.
History: L. 1975, ch. 97, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Effective date of section.
Where cause of action occurred in September, 1973, interest at 8% would be computed
from then notwithstanding this section did not
become effective until May 13, 1975, since section explicitly directs all (future) judgments to

78-27-45.

add interest computed from the time of the act
giving rise to the cause of action; legislative
intent is that the date of the act giving rise to
the action is in all cases the date used for computing the period of iµterest. Campbell v.
Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1979).

Financial information privacy - Written consent or court order for disclosure by financial
institution - Exception - "Person" defined.

No person acting in behalf of the state, or any agency, office, department,
bureau or political subdivision thereof, shall request or obtain, by subpoena or
otherwise, information from a state or federally chartered financial institution regarding the financial transactions or other records reflecting the financial condition of any person without first obtaining written permission from
the person whose financial transactions or other records of financial condition
are to be examined, or obtaining an order from a court of competent jurisdiction permitting access to the information. This section does not apply to reviews made by the commissioner of financial institutions to determine
whether or not a financial institution is operating in accordance with law. As
used in this act "person" shall include an individual, corporation, partnership
or association.
History: L. 1977, ch. 143, § 1.
Meaning of "this act". - The term "this
act", referred to in the last sentence, means

Laws 1977, Chapter 143, which appears as
§§ 78-27-45 to 78-27-50.
Cross-References. - Credit information
exchange, § 7-14-1 et seq.
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78-27-48

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2fl. - 46 Am. Jur. 2d § 897 et seq.
C.J.S. - 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 585 et seq.

78-27-46. Financial information privacy - Notice to person about whom information sought.
(1) In the event a court order is obtained pursuant to § 78-27-45, notice
thereof shall be given to the person about whom information is sought within
three days of the day on which service of the order is made upon the financial
institution, but no later than seven days before the day fixed in the order as
the day upon which the records are to be produced or examined. The notice
shall be accompanied by a copy of the order which has been served upon the
financial institution and the motion or application upon which it is based and
shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the rights of the person
under § 78-27-47.
(2) The notice shall be sufficient if, on or before the third day after issuance
of the order, notice is served in the manner provided in Rule 4(e), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, upon the person entitled to notice, or is mailed by certified
or registered mail to the last known address of the person. In the event the
person entitled to notice is deceased or under legal disability, notice shall be
served upon or mailed to the last known address of such person's executor,
administrator, guardian or other fiduciary.
History: L. 1977, ch. 143, § 2.

78-27-47.

Financial information privacyIntervention to
challenge or stay order - Burden on governmental entity.

Notwithstanding any other law or rule of law, any person who is entitled to
notice of a court order under § 78-27-46 shall have the right to intervene in
any proceeding with respect to enforcement of the order to challenge the
issuance of the order or to stay compliance therewith. Upon intervention, the
burden shall be upon the state, agency, officer, department, bureau or political subdivision obtaining the order to show that there is reasonable cause for
the issuance of the order and that the information sought may further the
investigation.
History: L. 1977, ch. 143, § 3.

78-27-48.

Financial information privacy - Reimbursement of financial institution for costs of obtaining information.

Any financial institution which produced records pursuant to permission or
in compliance with an order obtained under this act shall be entitled to reimbursement by the party or parties seeking the information, for costs reasonably and directly incurred in searching for, reproducing, or transporting
books, papers, records, or other data required to be produced. The commis431

78-27-49

JUDICIAL CODE

sioner of financial institutions shall by regulation establish the rates and
conditions under which reimbursement shall be made.
History: L. 1977, ch. 143, § 4.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-45.

78-27-49.

Financial information privacy of information restricted.

Admissibility

No information obtained directly or indirectly from a financial institution
in violation of the provisions of this act shall be admissible in any court of this
state against the person entitled to notice. This section does not apply in any
action between the financial institution and the person otherwise entitled to
notice or in any action in which it is claimed that the financial institution has
been the victim of fraud, embezzlement or any other criminal act committed
by the _person otherwise entitled to notice.
History: L. 1977, ch. 143, § 5.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-45.

78-27-50.

Financial information privacy - Act inapplicable to certain official investigations.

Nothing in this act shall apply where an examination of said records is a
part of an official investigation by any local police, sheriff, city attorney,
county attorney, the attorney general, or the State Department of Public
Safety, or the Bureau of Recovery Services, Department of Social Services.
History: L. 1977, ch. 143, § 6.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-45.

78-27-51.

Inherent risks of skiing -

Public policy.

The Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is practiced by a large number
of residents of Utah and attracts a large number of nonresidents, significantly
contributing to the economy of this state. It further finds that few insurance
carriers are willing to provide liability insurance protection to ski area operators and that the premiums charged by those carriers have risen sharply in
recent years due to confusion as to whether a skier assumes the risks inherent
in the sport of skiing. It is the purpose of this act, therefore, to clarify the law
in relation to skiing injuries and the risks inherent in that sport, to establish
as a matter of law that certain risks are inherent in that sport, and to provide
that, as a matter of public policy, no person engaged in that sport shall recover
from a ski operator for injuries resulting from those inherent risks.
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 1.
Meaning of "this act". - The term "this
act", referred to in the last sentence, means
Laws 1979, Chapter 166, which appears as
§§ 78-27-51 to 78-27-54.

Cross-References. - Hazards inherent in
mountaineering, skiing and hiking and hazards of area served by passenger tramways assumed by skier or sportsman, § 63-11-37.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Utah's Inherent
Risks of Skiing Act: Avalanche from Capitol
Hill, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 355.
From Wright to Sunday and Beyond: Is the
Law Keeping Up With the Skiers?, 1985 Utah
L. Rev. 885.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 4 Am. Jur. 2d Amusements
and Exhibitions § 81 et seq.

C.J.S. - 86 C.J .S. Theaters & Shows§ 39 et
seq.
A.L.R. - Liability for injury or death from
ski lift, ski tow, or similar device, 95 A.L.R.3d
203.
Key Numbers. - Theaters and Shows
6.

78-27-52.· Inherent risks of skiing -

Definitions.

As used in this act:
(1) "Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or conditions which
are an integral part of the sport of skiing, including, but not limited to:
changing weather conditions, variations or steepness in terrain; snow or
ice conditions; surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest
growth, rocks, stumps, impact with lift towers and other structures and
their components; collisions with other skiers; and a skier's failure to ski
within his own ability.
(2) "Injury" means any personal injury or property damage or loss.
(3) "Skier" means any person present in a ski area for the purpose of
engaging in the sport of skiing.
(4) "Ski area" means any area designated by a ski area operator to be
used for skiing.
(5) "Ski area operator" means those persons, and their agents, officers,
employees or representatives, who operate a ski area.
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 2.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-51.

78-27-53.

Inherent risks of skiing - Bar against claim or
recovery from operator for injury from risks inherent in sport.

Notwithstanding anything in§§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43 to the contrary,
no skier may make any claim against, or recover from, any ski area operator
for injury resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing.
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 3; 1986, ch.
199, § 8.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amend-

"§§ 78-27-37 through
ment
substituted
78-27-43" for "§ 78-27-37" and "may" for
"shall".

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Utah's Inherent
Risks of Skiing Act: Avalanche from Capitol
Hill, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 355.
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Inherent risks of skiing - Trail boards listing
inherent risks and limitations on liability.

Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent locations
within each ski area which shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing,
and 'the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in this act.
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 4.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-51.

78-27-55.

Repealed.

Repeals. - Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch.
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of

78-27-56.

skiing and the statute of limitations on such
action, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 43, § 1.

Attorney's fees - Award where action or defense in bad faith.

In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement, the
court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith.
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Without merit" and "good faith."
A frivolous action having no basis in law or
fact is "without merit," but is nevertheless in
"good faith" as long as there is an honest belief

that it is appropriate, and as long as there is no
intent to hinder, delay, defraud or take advantage of another. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149
(Utah 1983).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Attorney's Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Actions, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 593.
A.L.R. - Construction and application of
state statute or rule subjecting party making
untrue allegations or denials to payment of
costs or attorneys' fees, 68 A.L.R.3d 209.

Attorneys' fees as recoverable in fraud action, 44 A.L.R.4th 776.
Attorneys' fees: obduracy as basis for statecourt award, 49 A.L.R.4th 825.
Award of counsel fees to prevailing party
based on adversary's bad faith, obduracy, or
other misconduct, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 833.

78-27-56.5.

Reciprocal rights to recover

Attorney's fees attorney's fees.

A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in
a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney's fees.
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History: C. 1953, 78-27-56.5, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 79, § 1.

78-27-57. Attorney's fees awarded to state funded agency
in action against state or subdivision - Forfeit. of
appropriated monies.
Any agency or organization receiving state funds which, as a result of its
suing the state, or political subdivision thereof, receives attorney's fees and
costs as all or part of a settlement or award, shall forfeit to the General Fund,
from its appropriated monies, an amount equal to the attorney's fees received.
History: L. 1981, ch. 155, § 1.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah La~ Review. - Attorney's Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.

78-27-58.

Service of judicial process by persons other than
law enforcement officers.

Persons who are not peace officers, constables, sheriffs, or lawfully appointed deputies of such officers or authorized state investigators in counties
of 400,000 persons or more are not entitled to serve any forms of civil or
criminal process other than complaints, summonses, and subpoenas.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-58, enacted
1983, ch. 173, § 1.

78-27-59.

by L.

Immunity for transient

shelters.

(1) As used in this section, "transient shelter" means any person which
provides shelter, food, clothing, or other products or services without consideration to indigent persons.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), all transient shelters, owners,
.operators, and employees of transient shelters, and persons who contribute
products or services to transient shelters, are immune from suit for damages
or injuries arising out of or related to the damaged or injured person's use of
the products or services provided by the transient shelter.
(3) This section does not prohibit an action against a person for damages or
injury intentionally caused by that person or resulting from his gross negligence.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-59, enacted
1986, ch. 179, § 1.

by L.

435

78-27a-1

JUDICIAL CODE

CHAPTER 27a
SMALL BUSINESS EQUAL ACCESS TO
JUSTICE ACT
Section
78-27a-l.
78-27a-2.
78-27a-3.
78-27a-4.
78-27a-5.

Short title.
Legislative findings
Definitions.
Litigation expense
rized in actions
Litigation expense

78-27a-1.

Section
-

rized in appeals from administrative decisions.
78-27a-6. Payment of expenses awarded Statement required in agency's
budget.

Purpose.

award authoby state.
award autho-

Short title.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Small Business Equal
Access to Justice Act."
History: L. 1983, ch. 298, § 1.
Meaning of "this act". - The term "this

act" means Laws 1983, Chapter 298, which appears as §§ 78-27a-1 to 78-27a-6.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative
Survey - 1983, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 116.

78-27a-2.

Legislative

findings -

Purpose.

The Legislature finds that small businesses may be deterred from seeking
review of or defending against substantially unjustified governmental action
because of the expense involved in securing the vindication of their rights.
The purpose of this act is to entitle small businesses, under conditions set
forth in this act, to recover reasonable litigation expenses.
History: L. 1983, ch. 298, § 2.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27a-l.

78-27a-3.

Definitions.

As used in this act:
(1) "Prevail" means to obtain favorable final judgment, the right to all
appeals having been exhausted, on the merits, on substantially all counts
or charges in the action and with respect to the most significant issue or
set of issues presented, but does not include the settlement of any action,
either by stipulation, consent decree or otherwise, whether or not settlement occurs before or after any hearing or trial.
(2) "Reasonable litigation expenses" means court costs, administrative
hearing costs, attorney's fees, and witness fees of all necessary witnesses,
not in excess of $10,000, which a court finds were reasonably incurred in
opposing action covered under this act.
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(3) "Small business" means a commercial or business entity, including
a sole proprietorship, which does not have more than 250 employees, but
does not include an entity which is a subsidiary or affiliate of another
entity which is not a small business.
(4) "State" means any department, board, institution, hospital, college,
or university of the state of Utah or any political subdivision thereof,
except with respect to antitrust actions brought under Part 9 of Chapter
10 of Title 76.
History: L. 1983, ch. 298, § 3.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27a-l.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Attorney's Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.

78-27a-4.

Litigation expense award authorized in actions
by state.

In any civil judicial action commenced by the state, which action involves
the business regulatory functions of the state, a court may award reasonable
litigation expenses to any small business which is a named party in the action
if the small business prevails and the court finds that the state action was
undertaken without substantial justification.
History:

L. 1983, ch. 298, § 4.

78-27a-5.

Litigation expense award authorized in appeals
from administrative decisions.

(1) In any civil judicial appeal taken from an administrative decision regarding a matter in which the administrative action was commenced by the
state, and which involves the business regulatory functions of the state, a
court may award reasonable litigation expenses to any small business which
is a named party if the small business prevails in the appeal and the court
finds that the state action was undertaken without substantial justification.
(2) Any state agency or political subdivision may require by rule or ordinance that a small business exhaust administrative remedies prior to making
a claim under this act.
History: L. 1983, ch. 298, § 5.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27a-l.
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Payment of expenses awarded quired in agency's budget.

Statement re-

Expenses awarded under this act shall be paid from funds in the regular
operating budget of the state entity. If sufficient funds are not available in the
budget of the entity, the expenses shall be considered a claim governed by the
provisions of Chapter 6, Title 63. Every state entity against which litigation
expenses have been awarded under this act shall, at the time of submission of
its proposed budget, submit a report to the governmental body which appropriates its funds in which the amount of expenses awarded and paid under
this act during the fiscal year is stated.
History: L. 1983, ch. 298, § 6.
Meaning of "this act". - See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27a-l.

CHAPTERS 28 AND 29
RESERVED
IV

PART
PARTICULAR

PROCEEDINGS

C'HAPTER 30
ADOPTION
Section
78-30-1.
78-30-2.
78-30-3.
78-30-4.

Who may adopt.
Relative ages.
Adoption by married persons.
Consent to adoption - Paternity
claims.
78-30-5.
Consent unnecessary where parents fail to support or communicate with child.
78-30-6.
Consent of child - When necessary.
78-30-7.
Jurisdiction of district and juvenile
court.
Procedure - Agreement of adopt78-30-8.
ing parents.
78-30-8.5. Alien child - Evidence of lawful
admission to United States required.
78-30-9.
Order of adoption.
78-30-10. Name and status of adopted child.

Section
78-30-11.

Rights and liabilities of natural
parents.
78-30-12. Adoption by acknowledgment.
78-30-13. Repealed.
78-30-14. Division of family services - Duties - Report - Fee.
78-30-15. Petition, report, and documents to
be sealed.
78-30-16.· Definitions - Applications.
78-30-17. Nonidentifying health history of
adoptee filed with bureau Limited availability.
78-30-18. Mutual-consent, voluntary adoption registry - Procedures Fees.
78-30-19. Restrictions on disclosure of information - Violations - Penalty.
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